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"These people are not conquered like
those of New Spain":
Florida's Reciprocal Colonial Compact
by Amy Turner Bushnell
n 1605, Pedro de Ybarra, Governor of Florida, sent a terse note
to Fray Benito de Blasco, a missionary who had gone behind
his back to send his own envoy to the wild coast south of St.
Augustine. "These people are not conquered like those of New
Spain," he warned him. "This is a new land." 1 As the Spanish
extended their influence over the New World, they encountered
a broad range of environments and peoples, and how they related
to them differed from place to place. The maritime periphery
of Florida, which included parts of present-day South Carolina,
Georgia, and Alabama, had non-agricultural Indians to the south,
settled agriculturalists to the west, and seasonally mobile Indians
to the north, center, and east. This article examines the chiefdompresidio relationship that developed in Florida between 1565,
when Spain first established a foothold on the east coast, and the
early 1700s, when the presidio lost its hinterland. It addresses four
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Governor Pedro de Ybarra to Fray Benito Blasco, St. Augustine, 12-7-1605,
1
Archivo General de Indias, ramo Gobierno: Santo Domingo, legajo 232,
hereinafter SD 232.
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fundamental questions: how the relationship came about, how it
functioned, what the parties expected out ofit, and what conditions
could sustain or undermine it. The Spanish have left us written
sources. What the Indians thought must be gauged through their
reported speech and their behavior.
I

In 1617, Father Luis Geronimo de Ore, a Peruvian Franciscan,
was in Florida to inspect part of the missions of the Province
of Santa Elena, with headquarters in Cuba and a friary in St.
Augustine. He was on his way from the coast to the northernmost
Timucuan mission, Santa Isabel de Utinahica, deep in the heart of
present Georgia, when an Indian in the town of Tarraco asked him
what the Christian name of their town was going to be. Father Ore
answered, "Santa Barbara." He had no friar to spare, he said, but
he would arrange for the town's inhabitants to receive instruction
from a Christian Indian. With that, the Tarracoans disappear from
the record, name and all. 2
We could dismiss this mission story as a paragraph in the
fundraising appeal of a religious lobbyist, but in the first half of the
seventeenth century, Christianity did spread rapidly in the three
mission provinces of Guale, Timucua, and Apalache. The only limit
seemed to be the number of missionaries available. Paul Hoffman
calculates that in 1647 there may have been 35,000 baptized Indians
in forty-four missions. 3 In the unevenly fertile expanse between the
Florida wetlands and the Georgia piedmont, forty-four existing towns
had been solemnly christened with saints' names to show that their
leaders had accepted baptism and that a doctrinero was in residence,
teaching the people how to live like Roman Catholics, which, among
other things, meant that on the saints days of their chief and of their
town, they threw a feast and danced into the night. 4 To each new
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Amy Turner Bushnell, Situado and Sabana: Spain s Support System for the Presidio
and Mission Provinces of Florida (New York: American Museum of Natural
History, 1994), 49-51; John H. Hann, A History of the Timucua Indians and
Missions (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996), 161; Robert Allen
Matter, Pre-Seminole Florida: Spanish Soldiers, Friars, and Indian Missions, 15131763 (New York: Garland Press, 1990), 56.
Paul E. Hoffman, Florida's Frontiers (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2002), llO.
Bushnell, Situado and Sabana, 157-158, 184-186;John H. Hann, Apalachee: The
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doctrina the king made a 1000-peso gift of vestments, ornaments, and
a heavy church bell, personalized with the name of the town for which
it had been cast. Although these sacra effectively anchored the town
and made it susceptible to sacrilege, they were prize possessions. In
1682 two Yamasee chiefs at the old site of San Salvador de Mayaca
brought suit, with the help of the Defender of the Indians, against
their former doctrinero, Fray Bartolome de Quinones. Ordered to
dismantle the doctrina, Fray Bartolome had taken away the sacred
furnishings and two bells that His Majesty had given "to their pueblo
and no other," and they wanted them back. 5 The lords of the land
considered themselves anyone's equal, certainly a friar's.
Friars explained the alacrity with which the Timucuas came
over to the Christian side by the intercessory powers of the blood
of martyrs, meaning that of the five friars killed at the outset of
the Guale rebellion of 1597. We of a secular age look for earthly
answers and ask ourselves what positive and negative factors went
into the equation when the Indians of a frontier region weighed
their options and decided to accept the Spaniards' king and god. 6
Years ago, historians developed a set of answers to explain the
success of the "high conquest" of the imperial peoples of Mexico
and Peru. These explanations, which shade into myth, include the
Spaniards' superior military technology and use of psychological
warfare, their tactics of divide and conquer, and their arsenal of
pathogens. 7 The imperial peoples, their societies in shambles and
their gods discredited, perforce acknowledged the sovereignty of a
distant emperor and were baptized en masse. How far and how fast
the high conquest traveled and how much of it was a cover for civil
or internecine warfare were questions for later historians to address.
Less is known about the conquests of the non-imperial peoples
on the Aztecs' and Inkas' old frontiers. These entradas were long,
hard slogs, with meager returns in the way of gold and glory and
few chroniclers. 8 The Crown's practice of allowing bands of lesser
5
6

7
8

Bushnell, Situado and Sabana, 146, 159; Hoffman, Florida's Frontiers, 103-105.
For example, Susan M. Deeds analyzes Tarahumara and Concho incentives
in "Indigenous Responses to Mission Settlement in Nueva Vizcaya," in The
New Latin American Mission History, ed. Erick Langer and Robert H. Jackson
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995) , 77-108.
Matthew Restall, Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003).
For an exception, see Captain Bernardo de Vargas Machuca, The Indian Militia
and Description of the Indies [1599], ed. Kris Lane, trans. Timothy F. Johnson
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008).
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conquerors to self-finance by means of booty and slaves only resulted
in "lands renowned for live war." Partly in response to mounting
criticism over how Spain was allowing its new subjects to be treated,
partly in response to legal opinions that gradually defined the rights
of barbarians, and partly because missions required less manpower
than presidios, the Crown shifted to an emphasis on conversion.
Where the frontier was strategic, as in New Spain's near north, Chile,
Florida, and, later on, Texas and Upper California, presidios shared
the stage with missions without being as well regarded. 9 Where the
frontier was not strategic, as with many provinces of the Society of
Jesus, missions were self-supporting. The set of explanations for
the success of missions in frontier regions, Crown-supported or on
their own, includes the heroism of their founders, 10 the refuge that
they offered from slave raids and settler exploitation, 11 their steady
if monotonous food supply, replacing the wild foods of a degraded
environment, 12 the appeal of Christian magic, 13 and the trade goods
to which the Christians offered access. 14 Explanations of mission
failure are less common, perhaps because of the lack of consensus
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On the military's fall from favor, see Amy Turner Bushnell, "A Requiem for
Lesser Conquerors: Honor and Oblivion on a Maritime Periphery," in Beyond
Books and Borders: Garcilaso de la Vega and La Florida del Inca, ed. Raquel ChangRodriguez (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 2006), 66-74.
On the "Christophilic triumphalism" of the first historians of the Florida
missions-John Tate Lanning (1935), Maynard Geiger (1937), and Felix
Zubillaga (1941)-see David]. Weber, "Blood of Martyrs, Blood of Indians:
Toward a More Balanced View of Spanish Missions in Seventeenth-Century
North America," in Columbian Consequences. Vol. 2. Archaeological and Historical
Perspectives on the Spanish Borderlands East, ed. David Hurst Thomas (Washington,
DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1990), 429-448, citing 430-431.
Amy Turner Bushnell, "Indigenous America and the Limits of the Atlantic
World, 1493-1825," in Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal, ed. Jack P. Greene
and Philip Morgan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 191-221, citing
201-207.
Steven W. Hackel, Children of Coyote, Missionaries of Saint Francis: Indian-Spanish
Relations in Colonial California, 1769-1850 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2005), 65-123.
Daniel T. Reff, "The Jesuit Mission Frontier in Comparative Perspective: The
Reductions of the Rio de la Plata and the Missions of Northwestern Mexico,
1588-1700," in Contested Ground: Comparative Frontiers on the Northern and
Southern Edges of the Spanish Empire, ed. Donna]. Guy and Thomas E. Sheridan
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1998), 16-31.
Lance Grahn finds that Capuchin failure on the Riohacha frontier was due to
the Guajiro's access to non-Spanish smugglers. See Lance R. Grahn, "Guajiro
Culture and Capuchin Evangelization: Missionary Failure on the Riohacha
Frontier," in The New Latin American Mission History, 130-156.
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among historians, some siding with the Christians and some with
the lions. 15
Falling in line with a historiography still tinged by the antiCatholic, anti-hispanic Black Legend, some scholars have concluded
that Florida's missions were a failure, to be blamed on colonial
demands and native resistance. 16 It is true that in the tumultuous
first decade of the eighteenth century, mission structures and
populations vanished, leaving behind them not one tabby ruin
to serve as a tourist attraction. 17 The triggering cause was Queen
Anne's War (1702-1713), but the underlying causes were Spain's
financial crisis and feeble dynasty. Florida's mission provinces were
casualties of the fall of the Spanish house of Habsburg. But a whole
century of catechizing and coexistence should not be dismissed
as meaningless because a war cut it short. Without denying that
abuses invite reprisals, nor that there were instances of both, I
contend that the main problem with the colonial compact was not
that the Indians wanted out of it, but that neither they nor the
Spanish could make the king live up to it.
II

The compact that Spaniards brought to Florida was based upon
seven centuries of reconquista, during which Iberians developed a
workable system for dealing with subject peoples, complete with
unequal treaties, tribute, and self-governing republics, followed by
seven decades of explorations and conquests in the New World,
during which Spanish jurists and theologians thoroughly vetted and
discussed the "things of the Indies," in an effort to set them in legal
and moral order. 18 A consequence of this search for justification was
15

16

17
18

For a secular explanation, see Amy Turner Bushnell, '"None of These
Wandering Nations Has Ever Been Reduced to the Faith': Missions and
Mobility on the Spanish-American Frontier," in The Spiritual Conversion of the
Americas, ed. James Muldoon (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004),
142-168.
Jerald T. Milanich, Laboring in the Fields of the Lord: Spanish Missions and
Southeastern Indians (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1999), xii-xiv;
Matter, Pre-Semino/,e Florida, 154; Daniel S. Murphree, Constructing Floridians:
Natives and Europeans in the ColonialFloridas, 1513-1783 (Gainesville: University
Press of Florida, 2006), 51-71.
On the mistaking of nineteenth-century Georgia sugar mills for missions, see
Bushnell, Situado and Sabana, 24.
On reconquista patterns and New World conquests, see Lyle N. McAlister, Spain
and Portugal in the New World, 1492-1700 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1984).
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that, on the frontiers beyond the bounds of pre-Columbian empires,
Spaniards attempted to draw Indians into an enforceable covenant,
or "conquest by contract." 19 It worked by delegation. According
to historian Eugene Lyon, the legal basis for Pedro Menendez de
Aviles's "properly certified and recorded act" of possession taking
in 1565 was his three-year contract of adelantamiento with Philip II,
which in tum was "the semifeudal basis" for his power to make
treaties with the native peoples." 20 Written treaties of the kind the
adelantado sought served three purposes: they attested to amicable
relations with a defined group of natives; they obligated the leaders
of that group to offer assistance when needed; and they provided
Spaniards with a written claim to present to foreign rivals. 21
Charles Gibson once questioned whether the Spanish ever
actually treated with Indians as did other Europeans. The network
of agreements whereby Spaniards legitimated hegemony over
foreign populations was not, he argued, one of formal agreements
between equally sovereign entities, but one of capitulaciones, defined
as a contract between unequals. 22 Sixteenth-century Spanish efforts
to tratar y contratar had distinctly feudal overtones. They were the
familiar, unequal arrangements of a patrimonial, hierarchical
society, binding lord to vassal, patron to client, and God to man. But
for all that, they were also treaties, ending wars, marking boundaries,
and setting the rules for subsequent interaction. Documents that
Eugene Lyon has translated show that in 1579 and 1580 alone,
Captain Thomas Bemaldo de Quiros made separate treaties with
five chiefs: Coc;apul, Guale, Tupiqui, Oristan, and Tolomato. 23

19

This section is drawn from Amy Turner Bushnell, "Spain's Conquest by
Contract: Pacification and the Mission System in Eastern North America," in
The World Turned Upside-Down: The State of Eighteenth-Century American Studies at
the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century, ed. Michael V. Kennedy and William G.

20

21

22
23

Shade (Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh University Press, 2001), 289-320.
Eugene Lyon , "The Enterprise of Florida," in Columbian Consequences, Vol. 2.
Archaeowgy and History of the Spanish Borderlands East, ed. David Hurst Thomas
(Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1990), 281-296, quoting from 286.
Eugene Lyon, The Enterprise ofFlorida: Pedro Menendez de Avil,is and the Conquest of
1565-1568 (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1976), Appendix 1, 213219; Hoffman, Florida's Frontiers, 63; Bushnell, "The Conquest by Contract,"
302.
Charles Gibson, "Conquest, Capitulation, and Indian Treaties," The American
Historical Review 83: 1 ( 1978): 1-8.
Eugene Lyon, trans., "The Quiros Papers," (typescript, American Museum of
Natural History, 1985). See also Lyon, "The Enterprise of Florida," 286-287.
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In 1596, Florida governor Domingo Martinez de Avendano
took defensive action against French visitors to the coasts of Ais and
- Guale by inviting the chiefs of those two regions to be "regaled"
in St. Augustine. In his presence, the chiefs promised to accept
missionaries, send laborers to St. Augustine, and report foreigners
in their waters. In Spanish eyes, they ratified these agreements
when they accepted gifts, the currency of diplomacy. The
amistades, or friendships, of 1596 contained all four of the elements
necessary to the conquest by contract: promises of mutual defense
and exclusive trade, producing a Spanish sphere of influence; a
promise of obedience to the king in the person of his appointed
governor, extending the king's realms and bringing a new district
into the ecumene; and a promise to receive missionaries, undergo
indoctrination, and become part of a mission province.
Solemn ceremonies sealed the contract. The act of exchanging
hostages cemented the alliances for defense and trade. The act of
homage, in which the chief kissed the king's hand in the person of
the governor's, expressed the oath of fealty, to be renewed yearly.
The act of raising a cross on a town plaza symbolized the town's
readiness to receive friars . And the act of baptism announced the
chief's preparedness to accept the law of God and the demands of
decent worship. In lieu of signatures, these observed acts served as
evidence of contracts with the leaders of non-literate societies. The
function of the attending notary was to attest that the contract had
been validated in his presence and to file a written record. The
Florida archives preserve evidence of contracts that royal officials
engineered and stood ready to enforce, for the conquest by contract
was not designed to be reversible. Once yielded, obedience could
not be withdrawn. The caciquewho rose in rebellion was guilty of a
breach of contract. He could be deposed, stripped of his inherited
privileges, and sent into exile. To be restored, he must undergo
ritual humiliation. Performing the act of submission, again duly
witnessed and notarized, the cacique must throw himself at the
governor's feet and beg for mercy. This act, too, marked a change
of legal status. Those who had followed his lead forfeited the status
of Christians conquered by the gospel and entered the ranks of
nations conquered by the sword, subject to forced labor.
In Florida, chief-led rejections of the covenant were relatively
rare. More often, it was the commoners who drifted away from the
king's realms, individually or as families. Soldiers were sometimes
sent after these fugitives to return them to their duties as subjects
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and Christians. But m1ss10naries were never as dominant in
Florida as they were in upper California or in the reductions of
the Guarani. They raised their crosses on the plazas of established
towns and built their churches and convents with the consent
and sufferance of native leaders. The provinces of Florida were
language-based units of Spanish administration, not unions of
towns. And in Florida, conversion was unquestionably voluntary,
for whole regions rejected the gift of the gospel and membership in
the republic oflndians. 24 Among the "resistant" peoples were the
Cusabos and Oristas,25 the Ais, Tocobagas, Mayacas, andJororos, 26
the Yamasees, 27 the Apalachicolas, 28 and, three times, the Calusas. 29
Apalachicola and Calusa are classic examples. In 1681, five
caciques from Apalachicola, called to St. Augustine by Governor
Juan Marques Cabrera "to give obedience and receive the faith"
and explain why they had ejected the friars and soldiers that he had
sent to Sabacola, one of their towns, told the governor that they
had made the Spanish leave in order to save their lives from "those
who wander in bands as fugitives in the woods without recognition
or subjection to their caciques." They were prepared to trade with
Spaniards and to live in peace, they said, but "as far as asking for
friars, they had never done so or thought of doing so, and if God
ever wanted them and their vassals to become Christians they would
ask for friars then, but they did not presently find themselves with
that intention." 30 The Calusas, for their part, rejected a mission
ofJesuits in 1567-1568, a mission of Franciscans in 1697-1698, and
24

25
26
27

28
29
30

Amy Turner Bushnell, "Ruling the Republic oflndians in Seventeenth-Century
Florida," in Powhatan s Mantle: Indians in the Colonial Southeast, ed. Gregory A.
Waselkov, Peter H. Wood, and Tom Hatley (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 2006), 195-213.
Hoffman, Florida's Frontiers, 60-61.
John H. Hann, Indians of Central and South Florida, 1513-1763 (Gainesville:
University Press of Florida, 2003).
John H. Hann, "St. Augustine's Fallout from the Yamasee War," Florida Historical
Quarterly 68, no.2 (October 1989),180-200; John H. Hann, The Native American
World Beyond Apalachee: West Florida and the Chattahoochee Valley (Gainesville:
University Press of Florida, 2006), 137-173; Hoffman, FloridasFrontiers, 149159, 164; John Worth, Timucuan Chiefdoms of Spanish Florida Vol. II: Resistance
and Destruction (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998), 34, 132-135,
149.
Hann, The Native American World Beyond Apalachee, 79-136.
John H. Hann, ed. and trans., Missions to the Calusa (Gainesville: University
Press of Florida, 1991).
Gov.Juan Marques Cabrera, Letter to the Crown, St. Augustine, 11-10-1681 , SD
839/ 78-70.
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a second mission of Jesuits in 1743. 31 The younger of their two
caciques told one of the Franciscans that "if he was not going to
· give him clothing and food , it was no good to become a Christian
and no one would want to become one," while the old cacique
repudiated his baptism and said that he was not going to become a
Christian for "four old rags." The Calusas' idea of conversion, said
one of the later Jesuits, was that "without their doing any work, the
king our lord is to support and clothe them" and "furnish them
with rum. "32
When we focus on the Indian side of the colonial compact
instead of the Spanish one, the characteristics that stand out are
its voluntarism, its built-in reciprocity, and the interest that Indians
had in seeing its terms fulfilled. As Cynthia Radding reminds us,
the compact was a living entity that could change over time and
adapt to circumstances. 33 Our change of focus introduces new
questions: What reasons did Florida Indians have for entering the
colonial compact? What did they believe they had been promised?
And what recourse did they have if these promises were broken?
The quick answers are that the chiefs were attracted by the efficacy
of Spanish magic, the success of Spanish arms, and the availability
of Spanish trade goods to underscore their status and underwrite
their authority. The premise of the compact was that these benefits
would persist. But not every prayer brought rain, and not every
campaign enlarged the king's domain. Non-Spanish traders
continued to appear along the coast; Spanish supply ships and
monies were captured, sequestered, or delayed; and allied chiefs
found that, in wartime, keeping them in European clothes was not
a royal priority.
The governor and other Spaniards in Florida understood
the chiefs' frustration, but they could do little about it, being illsupplied themselves. Spain was over-extended, and in times of war
it could not meet its obligations in Europe, much less overseas.
With the many demands on the royal treasury and the king's

31
32
33

Maria F. Wade, Missions, Missionaries, and Native Americans: Long-Term Processes
and Daily Practices (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2008), 51-63.
Hann, Missions to the Calusa, 6, 43.
Cynthia Radding, "The Colonial Pact and Changing Ethnic Frontiers in
Highland Sonora, 1740-1840," in Contested Ground: Comparative Frontiers on the
Northern and Southern Edges of the Spanish Empire, ed. Donna J. Guy and Thomas
E. Sheridan (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1998), 52-66.
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patrimonial funds, only when Florida was in danger of being lost
to foreign rivals did the colony's strategic situation beside the Gulf
Stream bring it to the fore of the Council of the Indies' agenda. At
those times, the king's counselors might well advise the Crown to
order the Mexico City treasury to release the funds to catch up the
situado, shore up the Indian alliances, and construct fortifications,
send reinforcements to bring the garrison up to strength, and
summon a fresh batch of missionaries to extend the frontiers with
hastily founded "live missions," too little, too late. So what benefits
did the Indians expect from the colonial compact, that the lack of
them should prove so disappointing? Again, those expectations
were for a foreign culture's magic, a stronger power's protection,
and access to European clothing, labor-saving tools, trade goods,
and firearms.

III
While Spanish and Indian religions had little in common
besides their mutual mistrust, Spanish and Indian magic were not
as far apart as one might think and could even be interpreted as
competing systems of sorcery. In Florida, native sorcerers were
believed to have the power to make rain, 34 and Christians were
expected to demonstrate that their magic was equally powerful.
Menendez, who in Guale was called Mico Santamaria, "Chief
Holy Mary," gained influence there and among the Timucua as a
rainmaker,35 or, as he would have been called in sixteenth-century
Spain, a "conjurer of clouds." 36 When he set out to explore the St.
Johns River in 1566, Timucuan chief Hotina met him and asked
him to pray to his god for rain the way he had in Guale, because
Hotina's cornfields had gone six months without a good rain.
Before the Spanish could get to the town, five leagues from the
river, a hard rain began to fall, and Hotina fled into the woods
in fear of such a powerful sorcerer. But when the Spanish again
entered his chiefdom, he took Menendez as his "elder brother,"

34 Worth, Timucuan Chiefdoms, I: 67.
35 Eugene Lyon, "Santa Elena: A Brief History of the Colony, 1566-1587,"
University
of South Carolina Institute of Archaeology and Anthropology,
Research Manuscript Series No. 193 (1984) , 9; Hann, History of the Timucua, 55.
36 William P. Christian Jr. , Local Religion in Sixteenth-Century Spain (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1981) , 29-30.
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asking only that he be given a cross, a trumpeter, and six soldiers
to instruct his people in the new religion. 37 The adelantado was
· not the only Spaniard to claim power over the rains. At a 1583
conference in Santa Elena, Governor Pedro Menendez Marquez
told the assembled chiefs that the drought from which their towns
were suffering, the same drought that had broken that summer in
the vicinity of St. Augustine, was God's punishment on the northern
Indians for not becoming Christians. Many believed him, he said,
and asked for baptism. 38
Indian sorcerers also claimed the power to call down storms
and lightning strikes, which in Florida were not uncommon. The
traditional ballgame of Apalache and western Timucua was played
in honor of Nicoguadca, god of thunder and rain. 39 Menendez's
apparent ability to direct the force of a hurricane against the
French fleet and use it to give his forces cover for their surprise
attack on Fort Caroline would have been interpreted as a sign
that Nicoguadca had chosen sides. 40 Stormy weather also marked
the advance of missions into central and western Timucua. Fray
Martin Prieto recounted that in the chiefdom of Potano, when
the old chief ordered him thrown out of his house and beaten, a
sudden clap of thunder made everyone fall to the ground, and a
strong windstorm leveled most of the town, convincing the people
that he was a powerful shaman and allowing him to baptize 400
of them.41 With the right charms, Christians believed that they
could moderate a storm. Father Antonio Sedeiio, one of the
Jesuits whom Menendez brought to Florida, told Francis Borgia
that he had calmed the sea with a relic and by trailing an Agnus Dei
through the water. 42

37
38
39

40
41

42

Hann, History of the Timucua, 57-59.
Hoffman, Floridas Frontiers, 69.
Hann, History of the Timucua, 108-110. See also Hann, Apalachee, Appendix
2: "Translation of the Ball Game Manuscript," 328-353, and Amy Turner
Bushnell, "That Demonic Game: The Campaign to Stop Indian Pelota Playing
in Spanish Florida, 1675-1684," The Americas35Uuly1978), 1-19.
Hann, History of the Timucua, 50-51.
Luis Geronimo de Ore, The Martyrs of Florida (1513-1616), [1617-1620?], trans.
Maynard Geiger, Franciscan Studies 18 Uuly 1936), 112-114. See also Hann,
History of the Timucua, 165-168.
Antonio Sedeiio, Letter to Francis Borgia, Santa Elena, 2-8-1572, in "The First
Jesuit Mission in Florida," ed. Ruben Vargas Ugarte, trans., Aloysius ].Owen
in Historical Records and Studies 25: 59-148 (New York: U.S. Catholic Historical
Society, 1935) , 112-116.
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But as it happened, the control of Christian magic over the
elements was imperfect, and the droughts came back. Spring rains
were below average in 1559-1571, 1588-1591, 1610-1660, 16721680, and 1684-1687. In terms of the vital com harvest, the lowest
yields occurred in 1642-1646, when the baptized Guales left their
doctrinas on the coast to go and live with their heathen relatives,
and in 1652-1659, when the tithe records for northeastern Florida
bear witness to an eight-year drought and the Spanish had to extend
their com-buying expeditions past Guale, up into the non-Christian
chiefdom of Escamac;u. 43 Provisioning St. Augustine with com was
a perpetual problem, pitting anyone with reserves of com against a
governor who had the power to requisition them. 44 Storms, floods,
and lightning did not exempt the Christians, either. In 1592 a
lightning bolt struck the powder magazine in St. Augustine and
blew up 3,785 ducats' worth of munitions-a sign to the western
Timucuas and Apalaches that Nicoguadca had unfriended the
Spaniards. 45 The tidal surge of a hurricane destroyed the city in
1599, and other storm surges damaged it two years in a row, in
1674 and 1675. 46 Hardest to explain may have been the fact that six
friars on their way to Havana without leave during the Timucuan
Rebellion of 1656 were lost in a storm, wiping out the corps of
linguists in Apalache. 47
While Indian sorcerers had no efficacious magic against the
diseases that the Spanish brought, neither had the Spaniards,
beyond their childhood immunities. Although one Jesuit lay
brother claimed that he could heal children by reading the gospel

43

44

45
46
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Hoffman, Florida's Frontiers, 62, 77, 117, 120, 126, 142. Hoffman's rainfall data
come from David W. Stahle and Malcolm K Cleveland, "Reconstruction and
Analysis of Spring Rainfall over the Southeastern U.S.A. for the Past 1000
Years," BuUetin of the American Meteorological Society 73 (1992), 1947-1961.
Amy Turner Bushnell, "Royal Cedulas and the Power of Local Custom: The
Great Controversy of the Florida Granaries," in They Came to El Llano Estacada:
An Anthology of Essays Presented at "The Franciscan Presence in the Borderlands of
North America," comp. and ed., Felix D. Almaraz, Jr. (San Antonio, TX: Diocese
of Amarillo, 2006), 197-222.
Paul E. Hoffman and Eugene Lyon, "Accounts of the Real Hacienda, Florida,
1565 to 1602," Fl,orida Historical Quarterly 48, no. 1 Quly 1969), 57-69, citing 66.
Amy Turner Bushnell, The King's Coffer: Proprietors of the Spanish Florida Treasury,
1565-1702 (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1981), 46, 47; Hoffman,
Fl,orida's Frontiers, 75, 142.
Matter, Pre-Semino/,e Fl,orida, 59-60.
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over them and touching them with a crucifix, 48 most missionaries
confronted with the spread of European pathogens, of which they
- were the unconscious carriers, could offer the dying little more
than the promise of heaven and the threat of hell. Epidemics of
an unidentified peste, probably accompanied by typhus, destroyed
half or more of the population of the tidewater missions between
1613 and 1617, a net loss of 8,000 neophytes. Governor Andres
Rodriguez de Villegas, my~tified, refused to accept the suggestion
that fugitivism might have played a part in the depopulation.
There are no encomiendas, obrajes, or mines, so the only
settlement here is that of the infantry garrison. The
Indians are the best treated in America because they do
not pay tribute. A few work in the soldiers' sementeras, but
they are paid for their labor. The Crown spends much
money in gifts to the caciques each year. Altogether, these
Indians are the least worked and the best treated in the
Indies, yet they die here as elsewhere. 49
In 1650, when the first diseases had lost some of their virulence, the
arsenal of pathogens was reinforced by yellow fever, which struck
persons of Spanish and African descent as well as Indians. Smallpox
arrived on the scene in 1654 and within two years had killed up
to half of the baptized Indians in the three provinces.so By 1680,
Timucua was down to ten percent of its pre-mission population.s1

48
49
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51

Francisco de Villareal, Letter to Juan Rogel, Tequesta, 1-25-1568, in "First
Jesuit Mission," 75-79.
Governor Andres Rodriguez de Villegas, Letter to the Crown, St. Augustine,
12-27-1630, SD 225/ 30.
Marvin T. Smith, "Aboriginal Population Movements in the Postcontact
Southeast," Paul Kelton, "The Great Southeastern Smallpox Epidemic, 16961700: The Region's First Major Epidemic?" and John E. Worth, "Spanish
Missions and the Persistence of Chiefly Power," in The Transformation of the
Southeastern Indians, 1540-1760, ed. Robbie Ethridge and Charles Hudson
Uackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2002) , 3-20, 21-37, 39-64; Hoffman,
Florida's Frontiers, 72, 74, 77, 104-107, 126-130_
Paul Kelton, Epidemics and Enslavement: Biological Catastrophe in the Native
Southeast, 1492-1715 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), 83; Paul
Kelton, "Shattered and Infected: Epidemics and the Origins of the Yamasee
War, 1696-1715," in Mapping the Mississippian Shatter Zone: The Colonial Indian
Slave Trade and Regional Instability in the American South, ed. Robbie Ethridge
and Sheri M. Shuck-Hall (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 312332.
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Unable to save Indian lives, some missionaries developed the
macabre conviction that death could be instrumental and that it
was their place to use it. Father Pedro Ruiz, sent to reopen the
doctrina of Santa Catalina after the Guale rebellion, found that
during the period of apostasy the wife of the chief of Guale had
died and he replaced her with her sister. The chief entreated
Father Ruiz to let his sister-in-law continue to care for his seven
children, promising that his incestuous relations with her would
cease. But once order was restored, the friars told him that he must
send the woman back to her father's house and bring the children
to the convent for them to raise. Instead, he installed her and the
children in a separate house, which he visited to take them food
and firewood. Telling the story to Visitor Ore years later, Father
Ruiz said that he gave the chief a solemn warning: "I tell you in the
name of God that if you do not amend, I will have to bury you or
this woman within thirty days." The woman died twenty days later,
and on the day of her funeral the chief stood at the door of the
church in tears, entreating the other men to be satisfied with the
women that God gave them. This judgment and others like it led
to many baptisms, Father Ore reported with satisfaction. 52
Did the fallibility of Spanish magic cause the Indians to
question the colonial compact? Probably not as much as we might
suppose, for such is the avidity with which people seek to influence
the forces that govern the natural world that they are expert at
devising rationalizations to explain why those forces should at
times appear indifferent, or even hostile. Heathen magic, labeled
superstition, was unacceptable, as Father Francisco de Pareja's
meticulous Confessionary in the Timucuan language shows. 53 But
in the end, what mattered most to Indians, as to Spaniards, was that
there be a means of magic to lend the world enchantment, and,
willing to hedge their bets, they quietly added a layer of Spanish
magic to their own. For help in battle, as on the ballfield, Apalaches
resorted to magic of both kinds. Those who went out under their
own leaders to fight the Chiscas in 1677 carried a pennant with
a crucifix on one side and Our Lady of the Rosary on the other.
Yet thirty of them were willing to attest, and four caciques entered

52
53

Ore, 101-103.
Jerald T. Milanich and William C. Sturtevant, eds. , Emilio F. Moran, trans. ,
Francisco Pareja's 1613 Conf essionario: A Documentary Source for Timucuan
Ethnography (Tallahassee: Florida Department of State, 1972) .
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into their report, that at the moment of launching their main
attack, a bluish light the height of a man arose behind them and
disappeared into their midst, momentarily lifting the veil between
the natural world and the Other. 54

IV
Which of the European rivals, Spanish or French, would make
more dependable allies and trading partners was not yet apparent
to the observing chiefs in the mid-1560s. As Captain General
of Cuba and Florida, Pedro Menendez was responsible for the
defense of the entire Caribbean. He had destroyed one French
fort and the fleet sent to reinforce it, but another French fleet was
expected. When Menendez preemptively stationed troops at seven
deep-water harbors around the peninsula and up the Atlantic
coast, in each place inviting the natives to accept Christianity, the
chief of the Tocobagas at Tampa Bay asked the Spanish which
kind of Christians they were: the ones who threatened people and
stole their corn, or the other kind, who came and murdered the
first ones? 55 The alliance with Hotina involved the Spanish in a
regional war, with ready-made enemies in the Mayacas and Potanos
of central Florida, the Saturiwas of the coast up to the mouth of
the St. Johns River, and the Tacatacurus of Cumberland Island.
The Tacatacurus murdered a Jesuit and wiped out a detachment
of soldiers in Guale. The Potanos ambushed a party of soldiers
and killed twenty of them. The Saturiwas, St. Augustine's nearest
neighbors, killed cattle and besieged forts. A Gascon corsair,
Dominique de Gourgues, stopping by Cumberland Island, helped
the Tacatacurus and Saturiwas to capture a battery on the north
side of the St.Johns and turn its guns on the one across the river. 56
The war that had been internecine turned into an anti-Spanish
coalition and spread north to Orista and Escamac;u. French

54

55
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Juan Mendoza, Matheo Chuba, Bernardo de Cupayca, and Bentura de San
Luis, Relation of the expedition against the Chiscas, by four caciques of
Apalache, San Luis, 8-30-1678, in Governor Pablo de Hita Salazar, Letter to the
Crown, 11-10-1678, SD 226.
Felix Zubillaga, S.I., La Flarida: la misi6n jesuitica (1566-1572) y la colonizaci6n
espaiiola.
Bibliotheca Instituti Historici S.I., vol. 1. (Rome: Institutum
Historicum S.I., 1941), 269.
J. Michael Francis and Kathleen M. Kole, Murder and Martyrdom in Spanish
Flarida: Don Juan and the Gua/,e Uprising of 15 97 (New York: American Museum
of Natural History, 2011) , 20-21; Lyon, TheEnterpriseofFlarida, 197-201.
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corsairs again made Florida a regular stopover. In its harbors they
made rendezvous, careened their galleys, took on wood and water,
and traded with the Indians for deerskins. Far from claiming to
have eliminated the French from Florida, the governor and his
lieutenants insisted that corsairs were constantly among the Indians,
instigating rebellions and triggering assaults. A Frenchman could
do more with the Indians in one day, Menendez told the king,
than he could in a year, for the French let them live as they liked. 57
While the capture of Fort Caroline might have forestalled French
colonization, French trading vessels would be reported north of St.
Augustine for another forty years. 58 After 1620, Dutch ships and
fleets were frequently seen off Florida's two wild coasts, and Piet
Heyn 's capture of the silver fleet in 1628 showed the strength of the
"enemy Hollanders." 59 With French, English, and Dutch corsairs
available to bring them trade goods, the Indians could hold the
Spanish at arm's length.
What brought the Guales to terms in 1579, and again in
1582, were scorched earth campaigns designed to starve them
into submission, a tactic that Paul Hoffman calls "pacification by
terror." 60 This extreme solution had been recommended by the
adelantado himself, whose biographer, Bartolome Barrientos,
quotes him as saying,
The only way to make them keep their agreements-and
they are great liars and traitors-is to rout them out of their
villages, burn their dwellings, cut down their plantings,
seize their canoes, and destroy their fishways . Then they
realize they must do the Christians' bidding, or abandon
the land. 61
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Menendez to the Crown from Santa Elena, July 22, 1571 , and Menendez to
the Crown from Seville or Madrid, [1565], in Edward W. Lawson, comp. and
trans., "Letters of Pedro Menendez de Aviles and Other Documents Relative
to His Career, 1555-1574" (2 vols. of typescripts in the P. K. Yonge Library of
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Bushnell, Situado and Sabana, 36-40, 62-63, 68-69.
Hoffman, Florida's Frontiers, 112, 114. For "enemigos olandeses" see Francisca
Ramirez, Petition to the Crown, St. Augustine, 4-23-1624, SD 232/88. See also
Kris E. Lane, Pillaging the Empire: Piracy in the Americas, 1500-1750 (Armonk,
NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1998).
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The punishment of Guale was followed by a campaign against
Potano. In 1584, Gutierre de Miranda, a hard-bitten captain who
had once forced a soldier to kiss a dog, surrounded the councilhouse
at dawn, set it on fire, and posted a man at every exit to kill those
who tried to escape. One of the soldiers present on that "occasion"
said that he caught a blow from an Indian warclub that would have
knocked his teeth out had his mouth not been full of musketballs.
The Potano went into exile, where they would remain until 1605. 62
Having accepted missions in 1595, the Guales changed their minds
once again and killed five friars. Governor Mendez Canzo gave the
towns of rebels the scorched earth treatment for two years straight,
then ordered the town of Asao, suing for a separate peace, to make
war on the town ofTolomato. When peace finally returned, coastal
Guale was nearly annihilated. 63 Impressed by Spanish strength and
appalled by Spanish tactics, all of eastern and central Timucua was
suddenly ready to join the winning side.
Western Timucua and Apalache followed suit after Juan
Rodriguez de Cartaya made the western watershed safe for
Christianity with a gunboat built on "the river [going] to those
provinces." The captain's 1613 service record, a rare glimpse into
a little-known period, tells us that for 25 years the captain had been
present "in the war with the strangers who take themselves to those
coasts, and in the war with the natives of the land, and in the peace
and pacification of the said natives." Each governor in turn had
made use of him, he said, "sending him by land and sea among
the natives on embassies of peace and of war, assisting allied chiefs,
ransoming the Spaniards in enemy hands, bringing provisions
to the presidia, escorting the situado ships and patrolling the
coasts." Rodriguez had capped his career with "the pacification
of' the "chiefs of the coast from Carlos [Calusa] to Apalache,"
reducing them "to the obedience of Governor Juan Fernandez de
Olivera in the name of Your Majesty, in everything respecting the
religious on the frontier." 64 Even the cacique of Carlos had sent
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Bartolome de Arglielles, Letter to the Crown, St. Augustine, 8-3-1598, SD
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word that "he wanted no more war with Christians." 65 The road to
peaceful conversion on the Florida frontier had been cleared by a
fifty-year war, yet most of the caciques could truthfully assert that
they had been conquered by the gospel, not the sword. The only
good thing about the devastation that Spanish arms had visited
on Guale and Potano was that it never had to be repeated. Chiefs
whose political supremacy had been made conditional came to
St. Augustine from afar, like the Wise Men, to render obedience
to the Spanish Crown and position themselves as power brokers
before their subordinates could undercut them. 66 John Worth
posits that "the failure of a provincial cacique to pledge at least
nominal obedience" to the Crown would have been "tantamount to
political and military isolation" and have led to the out-migration
of his vassals to other chiefdoms. 67
Under the principle of cujus regfo, ejus religfo, the chief's promise
of obedience to God obligated his vassals to attend doctrina, learn
the prayers and catechism, and be subject to the law of God. 68 "We
friars who go out are well received," four Franciscans wrote to the
Crown in 1612, "and asked to stay or at least to put up a cross and
show them where we want a church built for the friar who is to
come." 69 Theoretically, a cacique could render obedience without
asking for a friar, but this seldom occurred. The presence of a
Franciscan, who as a religious specialist was the chief's subordinate,
gave him a go-between of the letter-writing kind and the town a
representative who could speak the governor's language. 70 "In
effect," reports Worth, "the establishment of missions within
aboriginal chiefdoms was completely subject to the will of Indian
leaders, without whose voluntary participation the friars could do
almost nothing." 71
65
66

67
68
69
70
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Governor Juan Fernandez de Olivera, Letter to the Crown, St. Augustine, 1013-1612, SD 229/ 74.
Hann, History of the Timucua, 142. One visitor, an eighty-year-old chief,
journeyed over 100 leagues. See Lazaro Lamadrid, trans. and ed., "Report on
the Missions by the Franciscan Commissary General of the Indies [Antonio de
Trejo y Paniagua], [1612]," The Americas 2:4 (1946), 489-497.
Worth, Timucuan Chiefdoms, I: 36-37.
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Frailes Pedro Ruiz, Pedro Bermejo, Francisco Martinez, and Esteban de San
Andres, Letter to the Crown, St. Augustine, 10-16-1612, SD 232/ 61.
For a collection of essays by historical archaeologists interpreting a variety of
mission sites, see Bonnie G. McEwan, ed., The Spanish Missions of La Flmida
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993).
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The Spanish presence in the provinces was light. There were
no settlers to speak of, even in fertile Apalache. 72 The Menendez
-Marquez family's cattle ranch of La Chua in western Timucua
did not impinge on the Indians' old fields, for as the number
of heads of cattle increased, the number of people fell. By the
time the herd reached optimality, 90 percent of the population
of the province was gone. 73 As Worth points out, the one officer
in Apalache in 1645 was a factor, allowing Governor Benito Ruiz
de Salazar y Vallecilla to move in on the Apalachicola deerskin
trade. No soldiers were stationed in Timucua until after 1656,
and none in Guale until 1661. 74 The Franciscans, whom Governor
Diego de Rebolledo accused in the 1650s of monopolizing trade
through the port of San Marcos and using the Indians' unpaid
labor, wanted no soldiers in the provinces at all. 75 The success of
Spanish arms may have been what persuaded the chiefs of Guale,
Timucua, and Apalache to fall in with the Spanish politically and
subject themselves and their vassals to "the law of God," but the
level of coercion in the provinces thereafter was low, too low for
force to explain why the Indians elected to remain in them. A
better explanation is the material advantages that they enjoyed and
came to expect.

v
In his report on the general Indian conference held at Santa
Elena in 1583, Governor Menendez Marquez observed that the
only way to attract the Indians to the preaching of the Gospel was
with gifts. 76 It was also the only peaceful way to persuade them to
render obedience. On the Chichimeca frontier, the king's gifts
were used to persuade wandering Indians to settle down and learn
to live under authority, but the Southeast already had sedentary
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For one chief's formal complaint about the behavior of Spanish settlers in
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and stratified native societies. On the Florida frontier, the king's
gifts were used to attract, attach, and empower the lords of the
land, 77 and through them gain access to the agricultural surplus
and labor reserve of their vassals, without whose services no
Spanish colony expected to survive. 78 The chiefs' reciprocal gifts
to the king-bezoar stones, furs, painted deerskins, ambergris, and
pearls-were automatically the governor's perquisites of office, as
they were for commanding officers in New France. 79
According to Florida treasurer Joseph de Prado, the Crown
first approved expenditures for gifts to the Indians in 1593, a
year after laying the expense of the situado for Florida on the
Mexico City treasury, which also bore responsibility for subsidies
to the other presidios in the Caribbean and the Philippines. The
"gastos de indios"became official in 1615, when a cedula authorized
a discretionary fund of 1,500 ducats a year above the situado, to
enable the governor to "clothe and regale the caciques who come
to give obedience and show signs of eagerness to be converted." 80
In 1627, the treasury officials accused Governor Luis de Rojas y
Borja of spending as much as 3,400 ducats a year regaling the lords
of the land, who stalked into town as if they were collecting tribute,
"and that is what they call it." 81 As missionization proceeded and
more caciques became eligible for these regaws, the Indian fund
continued its rise, to a peak of 6,744 ducats in 1650. 82
The chiefs relied on the situado to keep them adequately
supplied with four kinds of European goods: clothing appropriate
to their status, edged weapons and iron tools, trade goods, and
firearms. Clothing, distributed to the chiefs annually when they
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Joseph de Prado, Letter to the Crown, 12-30-1654, St. Augustine, SD 229/ 115;
Bushnell, Situado and Sabana, 43.
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came to kiss the governor's hand and renew their allegiance, was a
mark of status, proof that the Spanish recognized the cacique as an
_hidalgo, equal in rank to the governor and royal officials themselves.
This was no small expense. A 1607 ship manifest shows the prices in
St. Augustine for ready-made articles imported from Spain-linen
shirts with collar and cuffs of Holland lace, doublets of heavy linen,
hose of worsted yarn-and the cloth to make breeches and other
garments. The cheapest suit of clothes would have run as high
as twenty ducats, and a felt hat was nine ducats, when a soldier's
pay was only 115 ducats a year, most of which went for rations. An
hidalgo's cloak, breeches, and doublet cost many times as much.
His boots were of expensive cordovan; his hose were silk; his shirt
had the finest lace cuffs and collar. The oversleeves alone could
cost twenty-four ducats. 83
Supplying the chiefs with European clothing narrowed the
distance between the rulers of the republic of Indians and the
republic of Spaniards, while it widened the distance between lords
and vassals, for dressing like Spaniards set the native elite apart from
commoners dressed in deerskins. The cacica of Escamac;u, raised
in the governor's house, identified so strongly with Spaniards that
when Sir Francis Drake's forces occupied St. Augustine in 1586, she
reportedly donned Indian clothing as a disguise. 84 A traveler who
visited Cumberland Island in 1595 said of one pair,
He and the chieftainness were Christians and spoke the
Castilian language very well. He had a very good carriage
and countenance, of great strength. He was named don
Juan and dressed well in the Spanish manner. And when
the chieftainness went out she wore a cloak ( manto) like a
Spanish lady. 85
Unlike more durable Spanish goods, clothing is largely invisible
in the archaeological context, but the documentary record reveals
that, as an indicator of social rank, it was of higher importance. 86
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Chiefs might stay in St. Augustine as guests of the governor for
days, waiting for their clothing and footwear to be made and
fitted. One example, among many, was the embassy consisting of a
chief and nineteen leading men and mandadores that arrived from
Timucua on July 20, 1597, and departed ten days later with suits
lined in red calico, red hats, and double-soled cordovan shoes. 87
The king's commitment to clothe the chiefs in keeping with their
status paralleled his commitment to give annual alms of "habit and
sandals" to the Franciscans, enabling them to dress decently in the
garb of their vocations. 88
With European wars draining the treasury, these obligations
could not be met consistently. In 1628 the Dutch corsair Piet Heyn
captured Florida's situado along with the silver fleet in Matanzas,
Cuba; ten years later the king himself sequestered the situado for
more urgent needs. 89 The gastos de indios fell into arrears, funds
for it being released only four times between 1635 and 1644, and
then only at the approved, original level. 90 The caciques' clothing
allowance was shorted, with predictable results.
In Fray Alonso Gregorio de Escobedo's long poem, "La
Florida," when some of the baptized chiefs of Guale were asked
to give a reason for their 1597 apostasy, they responded candidly
(and perhaps apocryphally) that they had become Christians for
the sake of the "vestido," and when the clothing wore out, they lost
interest in the rites ("pusimos vuestros ritos en olvido"). 91 In 1647, the
royal officials wrote,
For some years now they have been behaving suspiciously,
which we blame on the poor collection of the situados and
the shortages in what Your Majesty customarily gives them
annually. Two years ago many of those in Guale abandoned
their towns ... to retire among infidels .... This, Sire,
demands a remedy, for this presidia cannot conserve itself
without the services of these natives. 92
87
88
89
90
91
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Hann , History of the Timucua, 142-143.
Bushnell, Situado and Sabana, 55-56.
Ibid., 45.
Hoffman, Florida's Frontiers, 118-119.
James W. Covington, ed., Pirates, Indians, and Spaniards: Father Escobedo's "La
Florida," trans. A. E. Falcones (St. Petersburg, FL: Great Outdoors Publishing
Co., 1963) , 152, cited in Hoffman, Florida's Frontiers, 96, 352 n.68.
Francisco Menendez Marquez I and Pedro Benedit Horruytiner, Letter to the
Crown, St. Augustine, 3-18-1647, SD 229 .
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When, in 1656, Governor Diego de Rebolledo called up the Guale
militia for what turned out to be a false alarm, the Guales waited
around for a month, then decided to go home. Rebolledo was
outraged to discover that the Indians were not under his command,
and their chiefs were soon complaining to the Crown:
The governor and soldiers, abusing us verbally, took away
all the bows and arrows and arquebuses we carried, and
told us that never in his term would he give us one thread
of the clothing that Your Majesty orders us given as alms ....
We are ashamed to see ourselves, Christians, in church,
assisting with the divine offices as naked as barbarians ....
Please tell him to pay us and to continue the alms of
clothing we are supposed to get every year. 93
The Council warned Rebolledo's successor to treat the Indians well
and to pay them what they were owed, including the clothing to
which they were entitled. 94
Picturing themselves as "naked as barbarians" was a rhetorical
ploy. The only Florida Indians who approached the level of
barbarians, as defined by Spaniards, were the Indians of the wild
east coast. Nakedness was a trope for the savagery into which
Europeans as well as hispanized chiefs could descend if an accident
deprived them of their European clothing, as integral to their image
of themselves as a hermit crab's borrowed shell. Castaways who
had fallen into Indian hands and gone "naked" would solemnly
aver that in their state of savagery, they had been "idle and slovenly
and full of vices."95 Clothing anxiety seems to have diminished in
the second half of the seventeenth century, at least less was said
about what caciques wore. This could be because their increasing
participation in the provisioning and deerskin trades was enabling
them to purchase the items that they and their families desired.
The high-status personal adornments that archaeologists have
uncovered in the elite sections of Guale and Apalache camposantos
testify to the chiefs' wealth, as well as to the fact that they resisted
the Franciscan norm of simple shroud burial. 96
93
94
95
96

Five caciques ofGuale, Letter to the Crown, 10-16-1657, in Informeon Governor
Rebolledo by the Franciscans of Guale, 10-8-1657, SD 235.
Fiscal of the Council of the Indies, notes dated 2-6-1660 and 5-24-1660 on
Letter to the Crown from caciques ofGuale, 10-16-1657.
Murphree, 43, 64.
Milanich, Laboring in the Fields of the Lord, 141 .
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Another important category in the caciques' gifts, paid for by
the gastos de indios, consisted of edged weapons and iron tools.
Swords and daggers could supposedly be brought to Florida only
by license of the Crown and in the baggage of an hidalgo, but
chiefs were also entitled to carry them and sometimes received
them as gifts. 97 No less valuable and more utilitarian were the
Europeans' axes and knives, which made it possible to fell a tree
or carve a canoe in one eighth of the former time. 98 The chief's
ability to acquire, maintain, and eventually replace the Europeans'
iron hoes, adzes, awls, augers, saws, hammers, hatchets, and nails
added to his authority, and the superiority of these tools to the
more traditional tools of shell, stone, or fire-hardened wood meant
that his town could increase its agricultural output, producing a
surplus that might function as either a reserve against famine or
a salable commodity, should a market for it develop. One soon
did. As early as 1592, in a single sale, the chief of Cazacolo sold the
presidio 263 arrobas of corn (more than three tons), for six axes,
three hoes, fifty varas of cloth, and fifty silver ducats. 99
In Florida, trade goods of low value and ready convertibility,
called rescates, served as currency, being used to pay laborers and to
facilitate a trade based upon barter. Normally, a man's contribution
to farming was limited to breaking the sod and turning the soil of
his wife's fields before she planted them, but a labor draft of 300
young men from the provinces prepared the soil, planted, hoed,
and harvested St. Augustine 's crop of corn-by Worth 's calculations
a million pounds year in the mid-seventeenth century, eight times
the amount of surplus corn being sent to the presidio from the
provinces. 100 These repartimiento laborers were paid in rescates
intended for cross-cultural trade, which is easiest to demonstrate
in Apalache.
In 1675, an Apalache whom the Spanish sent into Apalachicola
to spy on the English was outfitted to pass as a deerskin trader with a
supply of beads, hatchets, and hawksbells. 101 In 1677, when pirates
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Bushnell, The King's Coffer, 27-28, 35.
Warren Dean, With Broadax and Firebrand: The Destruction of the Brazilian Atlantic
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seized a frigate lying at anchor in the St. Marks River, it was loaded
with ranch products from Timucua and deerskins from Apalache.
Jn a nearby warehouse the pirates found more deerskins, along
with the kind of rescates used to buy them, mostly beads and iron
tools. 102 The next year, Governor Pablo de Hita Salazar sent off for
a thousand pesos' worth of European manufactures oflow unitary
value (hawksbells in two sizes, knives with black or white hafts, and
scissors) in order to pay Indian laborers to fortify the port. The
Indians who worked in shifts to construct the fort of San Marcos de
Apalache drew a ration of two and a half pounds of corn a day and
wages of one real, which was also paid in trade goods. 103 A second
source of rescates was the provisioning trade. By 1656, Spanish
frigates out of Havana were coming to Apalache to barter with the
natives for hens, paying for them with beads and knives, which the
Indians' other trading partners wanted. 104
The handicap under which floridanos and hispanized Indians
alike labored was the colony's chronic shortage of firearms.
When in 1656 the news came to Florida that English troops had
landed in Jamaica and Governor Rebolledo called up the militias
of Timucua and Apalache, he asked for 500 of the valorous men
who did not work in the fields, with their bows and arrows and
firearms and food for the road and a month's stay in the city. His
parallel message to Guale did not mention numbers, but asked
that all the Indians who knew how to use a firearm should come,
bringing all of Guale's firearms and corn. When the month was up
and the Guales decided to go home, the governor kept their corn
and confiscated their firearms, remarking to Alonso de Arguelles
that it was not 'just" for Indians to have them. Promising to pay

102 Testimonies of Juan de la Rosa, Antonio de Herrera, and Juan Fernandez de
Florencia, San Luis, 12-24-1677, fols. 584-586 in the Domingo de Leturiondo
Visita of Apalache and Timucua, 1677-1678, Escribanfa de Camara 156.
103 Governor Pablo de Hita Salazar, Order for the Trade Goods, 4-26-1678, SD
839/ 50; Ex-Governor Pablo de Hita Salazar, 5-15-1683, and Francisco de la
Rocha, 5-20-1683, testimonies in Auto on the Trade Goods, 6-3-1683, SD
229/ 159. For a history of this fort and of the 1683 pirate attack on it, see
Amy Turner Bushnell, "How to Fight a Pirate: Provincials, Royalists, and the
Raiding of San Marcos de Apalache," in, Pirates, jack Tar, and Memory: New
Directions in American Maritime History, ed. Paul A. Gilje and William Pencak
(Mystic, CT: Mystic Seaport, 2007), 11-25.
104 Brent Richards Weisman, Excavations on the Franciscan Frontier: Archaeology at the
Fig Springs Mission (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1992), 163-164.
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for the corn and guns when money came from the king, he used
the Guales' harquebuses to arm the Apalaches and some of the
Spaniards. 105
Against the friars' advice, Rebolledo insisted that the chiefs
and principa!,es report to the presidia carrying seventy-five pounds
of corn on their backs, like commoners. After checking to make
sure that they had understood him correctly, the Timucuas rose
in rebellion, declaring that they had been conquered by the
Word of God alone and were no slaves. 106 What John Hann found
remarkable about this revolt was the "relative absence of nativism."
In other mission-era revolts, friars and church structures were the
rebels' primary targets, but the chief ofMachava, a ringleader of this
uprising, told a friar who went to see him that "he was not throwing
off his allegiance to the king or abandoning the law of God." 107
Robert Galgano, similarly, detects no strain of millennialism in the
Timucuan Rebellion, in contrast to the Pueblo Revolt of 1680. In
Florida, "after fifty years of contact," he writes, "Indian leaders did
not wish to expel the Spaniards entirely, but rose to reestablish
the terms of colonial cooperation that secular Spaniards had
neglected." 108 Their revolt was an effort to get the Spanish to live
up to the colonial compact.
A condition of that compact was that the Spanish remain the
strongest power in the region, strong enough to protect their Indian
allies. Starting in the 1660s, isolated towns in the mission provinces,
as in other parts of the Southeast, began to feel the pressure of
English-sponsored slave raiders armed with flintlock muskets. One
effect upon Florida of this "land-based aggression," according
to Worth, was the "contraction of ... satellite communities and
farmsteads into more compact and defensible mission villages."
Another consequence was the number of refugees pressing across
the border. The "largest group of such refugees was the Yamasee

105 Hann, History of the Timucua, 204-205, 213-214.
106 Fray Juan Gomez de Engraba, Letter to Fray Francisco Martinez, Havana to
Seville, 4-4-1657, SD 225.
107 Hann, History of the Timucua, 221.
108 Robert C. Galgano, Feast of Souls: Indians and Spaniards in the Seventeenth
Century Missions of Florida and New Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 2005) , 7-8. For a broad overview of the 17th-century Spanish
Borderlands, see David J. Weber, The Spanish Frontier in North America (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).
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confederacy, which coalesced along the northern mission frontier
in the 1660s" and by the 1670s had "relocated en masse into the
µiission system. " 109
Spanish authorities occasionally tried to stem the flow of
firearms into the hands of Indians, but they never succeeded in
closing it off. By the mid-l 670s, Spanish firearms were reaching
the western provinces through the pigs-and-chickens provisioning
trade with Havana, and the east coast by means of the ships that
visited St. Augustine. Moreover, somehow, the Cherokees living
on the Upper Tennessee River in 1673 came into possession of
sixty Spanish flintlocks .110 In 1689, Governor Diego de Quiroga y
Losada ordered Enrique Primo de Rivera into Apalachicola to build
a trading post near the town of Coweta. But Spain could not outfit
every deerhunter who wanted a firearm. Only two years later, the
Apalachicolas left the Spanish sphere of influence to move closer
to the traders of Charles Town, entering Anglo history as the Lower
Creeks. Spain's own allies never received the quantity of guns and
ammunition that they needed. In the 1681 census, the Timucuan
towns listed only 20 guns among them . This may have been an
undercount, for when in 1685, after a wholesale Yamasee defection
to Carolina, the Crown asked Governor Marques Cabrera to collect
the natives' firearms, he responded that in Florida, keeping guns
out of the hands oflndians was impolitic and impossible. rn Parish
priest Alonso de Leturiondo agreed, writing in his 1700 Memorial,
The Indians of those provinces, and principally the
Apalache, have been and are the most valiant of all those
lands. Their arms are the bow and arrow, which they
handle with great skill, and, today, they use firearms as do
the Spaniards, and, in Apalache, they maintain their arms
as well as do the best trained officers. 112
The shortage of firearms was a problem of supply, not policy, but
for the provinces, that was problem enough. Between 1702 and
1706, Creeks armed with English firearms laid them waste in the
109 Worth, "Ethnohistorical Context," 19.
110 Hann, Apalachee, 148; Bushnell, The King's Coffer, 9.
111 Bushnell, The King's Coffer, 28-29, 34, 51 , 94; Worth, Timucuan Chiefdoms, II:
139.
112 John H. Hann, trans. and ed. , "Translation of Alonso de Leturiondo 's Memorial
to the King of Spain, [1700] ,"Florida Archaeology 2 (1986) , 165-225. Quotation
is from p. 199.
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Southeastern version of the proxy war, and like other soCiet.J.es
within what anthropologist Robbie Ethridge calls "the shatter
zone," the mission Indians scattered into slavery or exile. 113
In 1 706, Governor Jean Baptiste Le Moyne de Bienville
reported from Mobile that the commander of Pensacola had tried
to attract some of the Apalache refugees back to Spanish territory,
with "considerable presents to the chiefs," but "those leaders had
refused them, saying that the French assisted their allies better than
did the Spaniards and furnished them with arms." 11 4 Antonio de
Arredondo, a military engineer stationed in St. Augustine during
the War of Jenkins' Ear (1739-1748), presented a plan to reclaim
Florida's lost provinces with Spanish settlers. Once Apalache was
repopulated, he promised,
the nations of Yuchis and Talapuses, our worst enemies,
who trade with the English incessantly, will come over to
us, for they have always declared that if Spain should take
a different form than it now has, with a good heart they
would leave the English .... But these bring them all they
need for their clothing and their vices. 115
VI

The chiefdoms that acknowledged the Spanish as paramount
in the first half of the seventeenth century did so with conditions.
Their compact with Church and Crown was based upon a mutually
beneficial exchange: the Spaniards would add to the natives' store
of magic, stay regionally powerful, and keep them in trade goods.
They in tum would submit to indoctrination, fight alongside the
Spaniards, trade with them, and share with them their harvests and
their labor. When the Spanish neglected to maintain the flow of
gifts that supported the chiefs' status or the legitimate flow of trade
goods to pay for the Indians' labor and enable their trade, they
weakened the colonial compact, but when they resisted the firearms
revolution and, in a time of war, were unable to equip themselves

113 Ethridge and Shuck-Hall; Alan Gallay, ed ., Indian Slavery in Colonial America
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2009).
114 Hann, Apalachee, 307.
115 Antonio de Arredondo, Plan for Three Settlements, St. Augustine, 5-28-1738,
SD 2603.
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or their allies with sufficient firepower and ammumt:J.on, their
alliances with the chiefdoms dissolved as a matter of course. In the
words of Paul Hoffman, "the Spanish failed to uphold an important
implied bargain." The Indians would accept Spanish paramountcy,
and the Spanish would defend them against their enemies. "A
paramount's success in war was part of the accommodation that
made the 'subjects' willing to accept the tribute, labor services, and
religion that went with the relationship." The problem was that
Spanish protection failed. 116
Florida's mid-seventeenth-century Indian rebellion was not
a rejection of the colonial compact, but an effort to compel the
king to honor its terms. Given the fiscal crises of the Spanish
Empire, over-extending itself on three continents, the king could
not. During Queen Anne's War, Creeks and Englishmen invaded
Apalache, Timucua, and what was left of Guale, systematically
making the mission towns uninhabitable and capturing the ablebodied to sell as slaves. 117 Understanding at last that waiting for
the king to come to their rescue was futile, the survivors reviewed
their options and voted with their feet, refusing to remain in the
ecumene as subjects, or in the sphere of influence as traders and
auxiliaries. Did they at the same time forsake their Christianity?
Little is known about what became of most of them, but the
500 Apalaches who ended up in French Mobile reportedly dressed
in the European fashion, sang the Psalms in Latin, and threatened
to return to Spanish Pensacola unless they were provided with
a priest. During a yellow fever epidemic, one of the three cures
in Mobile, all sick, wrote to a friend, ''You cannot believe the
trouble the Apalachee are causing us. They are constantly
asking for sacraments." 118 If we accept the Apalache refugees as
representative, w~ must conclude that the dispersal of the Indians
from the mission provinces was not an apostasy, but a diaspora.
The romantics among us who think that all Indians should stay
as God made them are free to doubt the validity of the Apalaches'
conversion to Christianity, but there is little doubt that in the
Southeast their faith outlasted the colonial compact to reverberate

116 Hoffman, Florida '.s Frontiers, 1 79.
117 John E. Worth, "Razing Florida: The Indian Slave Trade and the Devastation
of Spanish Florida, 1659-1715," in Mapping the Mississippian Shatter 'Zone, ed.
Ethridge and Shuck-Hall, 295-311.
118 Hann, Apalachee, 305-310.
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beyond the borders of the lost provinces, if only in the form of
magic. In 1748 Governor Manuel de Montiano hosted a band
of trade-seeking Yuchis in St. Augustine, standing godfather to a
sixteen-year-old girl and giving her a funeral so fine that he thought
they all would want to die Christians. He added this postscript
to his report: "Another Indian whose wife bore a baby girl a few
days out of the city brought the baby back for baptism and said
that his children always died untimely and that if this one died
without baptism he would be inconsolable." 11 9 In this poignant
little story, we can either see a desperate father, hoping that holy
water can accomplish what charms cannot, or an opportunist who
has brought his pregnant wife on a difficult journey for the sake
of the baptismal gifts. How we read Montiano's postscript tells us
something about ourselves.

119 Manuel de Montiano, Letter to the Crown, St. Augustine, 3-15-1748, SD
2541 / 81.
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